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With the adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) in every state of the United States' and the enactment of the Paren-
tal Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 2 the widespread hope was that
jurisdictional confusion in child custody litigation would disappear.3 To a great
extent, that hope has been realized. The rampant jurisdictional competition
common among state courts before the UCCJA and the PKPA no longer seems
to occur.4 In a deliberate restriction and recasting of prevailing common-law
notions of child custody jurisdiction,5 both statutes carefully prescribe "jurisdic-
tion" to render an initial custody decree and to modify a preexisting decree,6
and both statutes impose on state courts the obligation to recognize and enforce
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona. I want to thank my colleague Winton Woods for his comments on
an earlier version of this Article and my research assistants, Tony Payson and Julia Rutherford, for their skillful
and cheerful help in tracking down sources.
I. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURis. ACT 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988) (Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been
Adopted).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3569 (1980) (codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)).
3. Commentators have maintained that the UCCJA itself stabilized the often tumultuous world of child
custody litigation. See, e.g., S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF CHIL-
DREN 30-31 (1981) (noting "beneficial effect" of UCCJA); Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modification,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 978, 1014 (1977) [hereinafter Progress Under the UCCJA]; Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody:
Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 FAt,. L.Q. 203, 226-27 (1981) [hereinafter
Interstate Custody]. Supporters of the PKPA claimed that the added force of federal law regulating custody
jurisdiction would fill the gaps left by recalcitrant state legislatures who had not yet adopted the UCCJA or had
adopted it with significant variations from the uniform version. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979:
Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and
the Subcomm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. Addendum 139-40 (1980) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
4. One cannot deny that the jurisdictional landscape is much more ordered today than in pre-UCCJA times.
For a discussion of the common-law approach to child custody jurisdiction, see infra notes 40-54 and accompany-
ing text. Moreover, the existence of a federal command for recognition of out-of-state custody decrees, even if
unenforceable through the federal courts after Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). surely reduces the
readiness of state courts to disregard a sister state's decree. Observers have tended to be optimistic about the
impact of the two acts, in particular the federal act. Although empirical data is lacking, some commentators
maintain that comparatively few cases have been reported after 1980 in which state courts have refused to recog-
nize an out-of-state custody decree. See S. KATZ, supra note 3, at 31; Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody. supra
note 3, at 226. Nevertheless, the justification for the optimism has been questioned. See, e.g., Blakesley, Child
Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291, 362-64 (1986).
5. See infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
6. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 143-44 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (1988).
Although the jurisdictional guidelines vary to some extent, each act contemplates the exercise of jurisdiction by a
state that has the requisite ties with the child or with the child and one contestant. See infra notes 150-54 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the ways in which the PKPA diverges from the UCCJA.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
custody decrees of sister states that have been rendered in accordance with the
statutory guidelines.7
Nevertheless, ambiguities persist.' One question, the focus of this Article,
is whether "personal jurisdiction" over the absent parent is a constitutional re-
quirement in child custody litigation. The Supreme Court has not definitively
resolved the issue, although it has offered occasional mystifications. In the am-
biguous decision May v. Anderson,9 the Court held that a child custody decree
from one state was not entitled to recognition in a second state when the render-
ing court lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent parent. The decision was
met with sharp criticism, both on and off the bench. 10 Justice Frankfurter's con-
currence, urging a flexible full faith and credit interpretation, seemed to win the
support of the lower courts and was ultimately followed by the drafters of the
UCCJA." Under the clear guidelines of the UCCJA, personal jurisdiction over
an absent parent is not a prerequisite to the exercise of child custody jurisdic-
tion, and the PKPA similarly does not establish personal jurisdiction over an
absent parent as a prerequisite to interstate recognition of custody decrees.' 2
Following the lead of the UCCJA, many state courts have held that per-
sonal jurisdiction over the absent parent is not a constitutional requirement for
custody jurisdiction.' 3 On the other hand, several courts recently have an-
7. The UCCJA has three key provisions that discourage relitigation of custody decrees. See UNIF. CHILD
CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 13, 9 U.L.A. 276 (1988) (requiring recognition of out-of-state custody decrees entered in
accordance with Act); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988) (limiting authority of court
to modify custody decree of another state); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIs. ACT § 15 9 U.L.A. 311 (1988) (facili-
tating filing and enforcement of custody decree of another state). The PKPA, likewise, requires recognition of out-
of-state decrees entered consistently with the terms of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), and limits the modification
authority of a state once a sister state has entered a decree, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(O.
8. The ambiguities are amply explored in the literature, and the following is only a representative sample.
See, e.g., H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 463-94 (2d ed. 1988) (examining
interpretational issues in each act and exploring the material inconsistencies between the PKPA and the UCCJA);
Bodenheimer, Progress under the UCCJA, supra note 3; Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: (a) Effective-Litigation Values vs. The Territorial Imperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 390-410 (1980) (discussing weaknesses in jurisdictional guidelines of
UCCJA); Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 297 (1981) (analyz-
ing conflicts between the PKPA and the UCCJA); Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition,
and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982) (exploring constitutional and statutory issues under UCCJA and
PKPA). Professor Coombs, as a Senate staff member, was a principal draftsman of the PKPA. Id. at 713-14 n.4.
9. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
10. See, e.g., id. at 539 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("A state of the law such as this, where possession appar-
ently is not merely nine points of the law but all of them and self-help the ultimate authority, has little to com-
mend it in legal logic or as a principle of order in a federal system."); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to
Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959).
11. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 12 comment, 9 U.L.A. 274-75 (1988) ("The section is not at
variance with May v. Anderson. . . which relates to interstate recognition rather than in-state validity of custody
decrees."); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 13 comment, 9 U.L.A. 277 (1988) ("This is in accord with a
common interpretation of the inconclusive decision in May v. Anderson .... "). Frankfurter's interpretation was
endorsed, as well, by the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 comment
c (1971).
12. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT §§ 3, 12 comment, 9 U.L.A. 143-45, 274-75 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §
1738A(c).
13. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 246 Ga. 24, 268 S.E.2d 648 (1980); In re Marriage of Leonard. 122 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1981); In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983). The Hudson decision was criticized in Garfield, Due Process Rights of Absent
Parents in Interstate Custody Conflicts: A Commentary on In re Marriage of Hudson, 16 IND. L. REV. 445
(1983). See generally H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 462-63.
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nounced that personal jurisdiction is a constitutional prerequisite for a valid
custody decree and have refused recognition of out-of-state decrees where the
absent contestant lacked minimum contacts with the rendering forum. 14 Com-
mentators are divided in their assessment of this problem, ranging from Profes-
sor Leonard Ratner's remarkable rethinking of personal jurisdiction law and its
application to the child custody domain15 to the late Professor Bodenheimer's
insistence on retaining the "status" exception to personal jurisdiction.16
In the recent decision in Burnham v. Superior Court,1 7 Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for a plurality, may have unwittingly breathed new life into the jurisdic-
tional implications of May. Burnham raised the question whether a state could
constitutionally assert jurisdiction in a divorce action over a nonresident who
was personally served with process while temporarily in the state, for reasons
unrelated to the divorce suit."' Although the divorce action sought a division of
marital property, child support, and a determination of child custody, the non-
resident father's jurisdictional challenge was directed only to the property and
support claims.19 Relying largely on the weight of tradition, the plurality upheld
the continuing validity of personal jurisdiction based on in-state service and ex-
pressly avoided reliance on the "minimum contacts" doctrine.20 Justice Bren-
nan, writing for another plurality, concurred in the judgment after engaging in
an "independent inquiry into the . . . fairness of the prevailing in-state service
rule. ' 21 Although endorsing different rationales, the justices were unanimous in
the holding that jurisdiction based on in-state service comported with the due
process clause. That holding freed California to decide the property and support
claims at issue in the case.
14. See, e.g., Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984); Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 63 Ohio St. 2d 96. 406
N.E.2d 1121 (1980); DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1989).
15. See Ratner. supra note 8 (urging that UCCJA be amended to protect, in part, effective litigation values
at core of personal jurisdiction theory); see also Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible
Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. I, 54-59 (1984) (arguing that due process protects reasonable
expectations and that absent parents should anticipate litigation in state having best access to information relevant
to custody question); Garfield, supra note 13, at 452-59 (urging flexible application of minimum contacts doctrine
in child custody arena).
16. See Bodenheimer & Neely-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and
Kulko, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 229, 239-41 (1979). Writers have disagreed as well about the proper boundaries of
the status exception to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Blakesley, supra note 4. at 339-49 (distinguishing divorce
from custody).
17. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
18. Id. at 2109.
19. Petitioner Dennis Burnham conceded in his Petition for Certiorari that a state may dissolve a marriage
and decide child custody "without personal jurisdiction." See Petition for Certiorari at 13, Burnham v. California
Superior Court (No. 89-44). (July 12, 1989) (cert. granted in 110 S. Ct. 47 (1989)). Petitioner explained that
-'[a) state can . . . adjudicate issues regarding child custody and visitation, if the conditions of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act are met because this is a question of subject matter jurisdiction and again only involves
status." Id.
20. Justice Scalia wrote, "[t]he short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone
constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process
standard of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115. By relying on
tradition, Scalia avoided an inquiry into the subjective fairness of transient jurisdiction.
21. Burnham, I10 S. Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring). Concurring separately, Justice White relied on
the widespread acceptance of transient jurisdiction. Id. at 2119-20. In addition, Justice Stevens, in his concurring
opinion, relied on a combination of "the historical evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia, considera-
tions of fairness identified by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice White." Id. at 2126.
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Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, writing at this point only for himself and two
other justices, apparently assumed that jurisdiction to determine child custody,
as well as property and support claims, was at stake.22 Preferring the more ob-
jective standard of in-state service, Justice Scalia rejected the suggestion that
the father's three-day stay in California could support personal jurisdiction on a
minimum contacts analysis. He explained, "[t]hree days' worth of. . . benefits
strike us as powerfully inadequate to establish, as an abstract matter, that it is
'fair' for California to decree the ownership of all Mr. Burnham's worldly goods
acquired during the ten years of his marriage, and the custody over his
children."2
Justice Scalia, under the misperception that the petitioner was challenging
California's authority to determine the custody of his children, clearly assumed
that personal jurisdiction over the husband was a prerequisite to, and a suffi-
cient basis for, custody jurisdiction. That assumption, however, is contrary to
prevailing notions of custody jurisdiction. In the passage referred to above, Jus-
tice Scalia equated jurisdiction to determine property claims with jurisdiction to
determine custody. He focused on the father's contacts with the forum and ig-
nored the fact that the children had been living for more than a year in Califor-
nia with their mother. By disregarding the children's residence in California,
the Justice overlooked a circumstance that would have been of critical impor-
tance under the UCCJA and the PKPA in establishing judicial competence. His
implicit approach, applying ordinary concepts of personal jurisdiction in an un-
differentiated way to custody, support, and property claims, would significantly
undercut the state and federal acts. Of great moment to children and their fam-
ilies, his approach would leave the states with decidedly less power to render
final and enforceable custody decrees.
In this Article, I first examine the dichotomous terminology of "in per-
sonam" or "personal" jurisdiction, on the one hand, and "subject matter" juris-
diction, on the other, and the problems raised by the use of these formalistic
labels in the child custody context. I then explore the common-law formulations
of child custody jurisdiction, including the "status exception" to personal juris-
diction. The relevant Supreme Court pronouncements on custody jurisdiction
are analyzed, with particular emphasis on May v. Anderson. The jurisdictional
premises of the UCCJA and the PKPA, representing the widely-accepted con-
temporary statutory solutions to the problem, are briefly described. Finally,
drawing on themes from the jurisprudence of state court jurisdiction, including
the various Burnham opinions, I offer an analytic framework that diverges in
some important respects from the current treatment of jurisdiction to determine
custody, but nevertheless validates the basic structure of the UCCJA and the
PKPA.
In the suggested framework, I posit that a court needs "territorial jurisdic-
tion" over the child custody dispute, rather than personal jurisdiction over the
absent contestant, in order to render a valid and enforceable decree. I argue
22. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia in this part of the opinion. See Burn-
ham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
23. Burnham, I 10 S. Ct. at 2117 (emphasis added).
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that the needed judicial power arises from child-centered contacts with the fo-
rum state and that the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJA and the PKPA
provide more protection for the absent custody contestant than the constitu-
tional minimum. Under Justice Scalia's approach in Burnham, such a jurisdic-
tional theory, founded on tradition and reflected in current practice, affords the
absent parent all the process that is due under the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, Justice Scalia's familiar deference to state authority takes on impor-
tance in the context of child custody jurisdiction. The unique legislative consen-
sus at the state and federal levels has created a workable, if flawed, system of
interstate custody adjudication. A return to constitutional indeterminacy in this
area would be particularly unfortunate.24 At the same time, the theory of terri-
torial jurisdiction advanced in this Article reasonably accommodates the needs
of children, litigants, and judges "in the trenches" of custody warfare. As such,
the theory should satisfy the fairness standard articulated by other members of
the Burnham Court.
I. GETTING INTO THE PROBLEM
A. The Words
First-year law students learn that legal terms carry multiple meanings, but
the chameleon term "jurisdiction" probably confounds more students than does
any other word. Students must accept that the word may refer to, among other
things, geographic territory, a sovereign's reach, legislative authority, executive
authority, judicial power over parties, and judicial power over categories of
cases. Professors drill into students that some kinds of jurisdiction may be
waived and some may not, that some kinds of jurisdictional defects may be
raised in a collateral attack and some may not, that some jurisdictional require-
ments are constitutionally based and some are not. As in other areas of the law,
the terminology takes on a life of its own, and soon the repetition of the terms is
considered an explanation.
Judicial competence, according to our legal tradition, depends on the exis-
tence of, first, subject matter jurisdiction and, second, personal jurisdiction, ju-
risdiction in rem, or some other form of "territorial" jurisdiction. 5 By bifur-
24. For other critiques of indeterminacy in the field of personal jurisdiction, see Posnak. The Court Doesn't
Know Its Asahi front Its Wortman: A Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints on Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law. 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 875 (1990) (urging a more certain and simple test for personal jurisdiction because
of the preliminary nature of the issue); Louis. The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A
Comment on Word-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk. 58 N.C. L. REV. 407 (1980)
(urging a more certain test for personal jurisdiction in order to facilitate the task of decisionmaking for the
Supreme Court).
25. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Writing for the majority in Pennoyer, Justice Field
stated:
To give [judicial] proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution-that is,
by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a
determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by
service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance. Id. at 733.
The American Law Institute has devised this formulation:
A court has authority to render judgment in an action when the court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action ... and
I.1991]
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cating the question in that manner, a court ensures that it has authority to hear
the category of controversy before it, as well as the necessary authority within a
system of coordinate sovereigns, based on territorial connections, to enforce a
decree against a particular defendant or piece of property.2" Many courts sitting
in child custody cases, however, have opined that only subject matter jurisdic-
tion is necessary, notwithstanding the fact that such courts must ensure compli-
ance with their decrees and do so ordinarily through their contempt powers.27
One court, for example, explained that judicial power to adjudicate custody
existed under the UCCJA "without acquiring personal jurisdiction over an ab-
sent party. Once the subject matter jurisdiction of the . . . court has been es-
tablished, the resulting custody decree is binding if the absent party has been
given notice and opportunity to be heard as provided by [the UCCJA] .'28
Other courts have similarly reasoned that the UCCJA's guarantees of notice
and opportunity to be heard, along with the statute's provisions for forum non
conveniens dismissals,29 protect the "due process" rights of an absent parent,
once subject matter jurisdiction has been established. 0
As a result of the frequent characterization of judicial authority in custody
cases as subject matter jurisdiction, certain essential qualities of subject matter
jurisdiction inevitably come into play. Thus caught in their own definitional
snare, courts have ruled that jurisdiction in child custody disputes cannot be
consensually bestowed upon a court by the appearance of two willing parents .3
We are told that because the UCCJA concerns subject matter jurisdiction, not
(1) The party against whom judgment is to be rendered has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
or
(2) Adequate notice has been afforded the party . . . and the court has territorial jurisdiction of the
action.
RLSTAT, ILNT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § I (1982). I prefer the term "territorial jurisdiction" to other phrases
sometimes used ("adjudicative jurisdiction," or "judicial jurisdiction," for example) because of its acknowledge-
ment of a geographical limitation on the reach of state court authority.
26. See R. WtLINTRAUB. COMMENTARY ON TiE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.1. at 90-91 (1986).
27. See. e.g., Boisvert v. Boisvert, 143 Vt. 445, 466 A.2d 1184 (1983): Mace v. Mace, 215 Neb. 640, 341
N.W.2d 307 (1983); Loper v. Superior Court, 126 Ariz. 14, 612 P.2d 65 (1980). Professor Ratner observed that
Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948), was the first child custody case in which the
court confused the concepts of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. See Ratner, supra note 8. at
408-10. At least one state court, however, used the subject matter characterization before Sampsell. See Dorman
v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732. I So. 2d 734, 736 (1941) ("The subject matter involved in the question of custody of
minor children is the children themselves, and if the court has not jurisdiction of the children it has not jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter .... ").
28. Martinez v. Reed, 49 So. 2d 303, 306 n.] (La. Ct. App. 1986).
29. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURMS. ACT § 7, 9 U.L.A. 233-34 (1988).
30. See. e.g.. lt re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 457-58, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903. 911 (1981) (any
requirement of personal jurisdiction would "emasculate" UCCJA, and custody decree is entitled to recognition if
parent has received notice and opportunity to be heard); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 460 A.2d 1360. 1364 (Me. 1983)
(sister state need not recognize custody decree under UCCJA if absent parent did not have reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard).
31. See. e.g.. Brooks v. Brooks. 546 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Sholty v. Carruth, 126 Ariz. 458.
616 P.2d 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); In re Marriage of Olive. 340 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). But see
Range v. Range, 232 Neb. 410. 411-12, 440 N.W.2d 691, 693 (1989) (mother's general appearance conferred
jurisdiction on court in custody modification action). Significantly. Professor Bodenheimer argued that the Com-
missioners rejected consent as a jurisdictional basis under the UCCJA because they wanted to prevent forum
shoppers from "luring a concerned parent into submitting to another state's jurisdiction." Bodenheimer, Progress
Under the UCCJA. supra note 3, at 998-1000.
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personal jurisdiction, the submission of a party to the jurisdiction of the court
does not confer the necessary power upon the court.3 2 Similarly, appellate
courts have allowed belated challenges to trial courts' authority in custody dis-
putes because subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.33 Finally,
consistent with traditional learning, the absence of "subject matter" jurisdiction
in a child custody proceeding leaves any resulting decree vulnerable to collateral
attack.3 4 One state court, for example, refused recognition of another state's
custody decree on the ground that the foreign court lacked subject matter juris-
diction.35 The mother's belated attack on the first court's jurisdiction was al-
lowed, even though she had apparently willingly participated in that court's pro-
ceedings through counsel.36
Significantly, at least a few courts may be looking more carefully at the
terminology. In one recent decision, an appellate court opined, albeit with some
lack of clarity, that the jurisdictional limitations of the UCCJA are not subject
matter jurisdiction but are "refinements of the ancillary capacity of a trial court
to exercise authority over a particular case" and are subject to waiver.3 7 An-
other judicial panel explained that jurisdiction under the UCCJA refers to the
legislature's discretionary limit upon the exercise of existing jurisdiction and not
to due process limits of subject matter or personal jurisdiction.3 8 Such language
reveals that the courts are struggling for the appropriate approach to, and justi-
fications for, child custody jurisdiction.3
On the other hand, several recent courts have explicitly assumed that "per-
sonal jurisdiction" over the absent contestant is constitutionally necessary
before a court may determine custody. In particular, the assumption has sur-
faced in cases not clearly governed by the UCCJA. At least two courts, for
instance, have concluded that custody decrees rendered by American Indian tri-
bal courts are invalid unless the tribe had personal jurisdiction over the oppos-
ing parent, based on the parent's contacts with the reservation. 40
32. Mace v. Mace, 215 Neb. 640, 640 syllabus 4. 341 N.W.2d 307, 309-10 syllabus 4 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Boisvcrt v. Boisvert, 143 Vt. 445, 466 A.2d 1184 (1983).
34. Id.
35. See Sholty v. Carruth, 126 Ariz. 458, 616 P.2d 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
36. Id. Commentators have disputed the propriety of the "subject matter" characterization found in the case
law. Several have criticized reliance on the formalistic terminology. See Ratner, supra note 8, at 406-10 (arguing
that UCCJA's jurisdictional provisions address personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction); Dor-
sanco. Due Process. Full Faith and Credit, and Family Law Litigation, 36 Sw. L.J. 1085 (1983) (criticizing
reliance on "personal jurisdiction" and "subject matter jurisdiction" terminology). Others, however, have appar-
ently endorsed it. See H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 464-65 (seeming to endorse "subject matter" characterization):
Weintraub, Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship Without Jurisdiction Over Both Parents, 36 Sw. L.J. 1167,
1172-74 (1983) (same); Note, Biggers v. Biggers-The Limitation of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction under the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 25 IDAHo L. REV. 427 (1988-89) (same).
37. Williams v. Williams, 555 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ind. 1990).
38. In re Marriage of Slate, 181 11. App. 3d 110, 114, 536 N.E.2d 894, 896 (1989).
39. A similar point has been made in other contexts. See von Mehren & Trautman. Jurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis. 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121. 1135-36 (1966) (terminology of "in personam." "in rem,"
and "quasi in rem." obscures underlying policy issues); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?. 37 TEx. L.
REv. 657, 661 (1959) (criticizing jargon of in rem jurisdiction to explain power of state courts to decree ex parte
divorces, noting that "realistic analysis is thus obscured").
40. See DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1989); Application of Defender. 435
N.W.2d 717. 720-21 (S.D. 1989).
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The notion that one dimension of judicial authority is necessary in child
custody litigation but not the other makes little sense. Nevertheless, because
"'personal jurisdiction" has come to mean the power of a court to impose mone-
tary liability on a defendant, its application to the child custody context is prob-
lematic. As explained in Part III of this Article, the tripolar nature of the child
custody dispute distinguishes it from the ordinary bipolar civil action; jurisdic-
tional doctrines developed for the latter are not necessarily appropriate for the
former. The existence of some form of territorial jurisdiction, however, is an
inherent requirement for any civil court within our multisovereigned system.
Absent consent of the parties, courts have always required some territorial con-
nection between the dispute and the forum state before a court of that state can
assert authority over the litigants. If a court proceeds in the absence of territo-
rial jurisdiction, the court, by definition, lacks authority to compel compliance
with its orders.
The child custody court's power to render a binding custody decree may be
best described as a function of two components of judicial authority: subject
matter jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction in this
context is a conclusory term indicating that there are sufficient geographic con-
nections between the dispute and the forum to support the forum court's
power.41 The remainder of this Article addresses the nature of the required geo-
graphic connections in the constitutional calculus.
B. Common-Law Formulations
1. Factual Requirements for Jurisdiction
Traditionally, the child's domicile was the basis for child custody jurisdic-
tion, domicile being deemed a connection sufficient to give rise to the power to
adjust the child's relations with others.42 The child's domicile at common law
followed that of the father,43 but the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws took
the position that the child's domicile should follow the custodial parent where
the parents were living apart,44 and support for that rule is found even in early
cases.45 Under the domicile rule, a child's temporary presence in a state was not
41. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 86 (1985) ("IT]he concepts of in personant and in ren
jurisdiction are simply instruments for defining what should be the proper limits of state court jurisdiction, and,
because they can be so easily manipulated, question-begging instruments at that.").
42. See Dorman v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 736, 1 So. 2d 734. 736 (1941). Lanning v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310.
99 S.W. 542 (1907): RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934); Goodrich, Custody of Children in
Divorce Suits: The Conflict of Laws Problem. 7 CORNELL L.Q. I, 5 (1921), 2 J. BEALE. CONFLICT OF LAWS §
144.3 (1935). Some early treatises announced the rule that a court with jurisdiction to grant divorce also had
jurisdiction to award child custody, but such statements seem intended to assure the bare existence of judicial
power to issue custody decrees. See 2 J. BisnIop, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE. DIVORCE. AND SEPARATION
§§ 1179-90 at 460-63 (1891).
43. See. e.g.. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933). Johnson v. Taylor. 140 Ark. 100. 215 S.W.
162 (1919) (children lived with mother at all times, but their domicile was deemed that of estranged father):
Beale. Dornicil of an Infant, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 103, 104 (1923).
44. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32 (1934).
45. See. e.g., In re Thorn, 240 N.Y. 444, 148 N.E. 630 (1925). The Restatement view today is that a child's
domicile is that of the parent with whom he or she lives, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22
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a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to determine custody.4 As one court explained,
only a court of the state where the child is domiciled can determine custody
since the custody proceeding is in the nature of an action in rem.47 Moreover,
the majority rule seems to have been that a court, having once decreed custody
on the basis of the child's domicile, would lose jurisdiction to modify the decree
if the child and custodial parent later relocated to another state.
48
The common law's exclusive focus on domicile provoked criticism that the
domicile requirement was formalistic and that it often ignored the child's actual
location.4 9 Some critics reasoned that the child should be physically present
within the jurisdiction of the court in order for the court to be able to make a
considered determination of the child's best interests. 50 Even during the heyday
of the domicile rule, courts occasionally voiced support for the assumption of
jurisdiction based on the child's presence-especially in cases of emergency--or
actual residence, rather than solely on the child's technical domicile.51
In addition, a few early courts intimated that personal jurisdiction over
both parents was a necessary element of competence to determine custody, but
the cases seem to be influenced by other factors. 52 In particular, the cases indi-
cate that if the child and the defending parent were both outside the forum
state, or if the child's presence in the forum had been obtained surreptitiously,
the court would lack authority to determine the child's custody. 5 Moreover, a
few commentators took the position that a binding custody decree could not be
(1971). but the father's domicile may still carry weight where the child lives with neither the mother nor the
father. See id. at comment (d).
46. Lanning v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310. 99 S.W. 542 (1907) (child's temporary presence in Texas did not
bestow jurisdiction on Texas courts to determine custody, where child was living with father in Louisiana and was
deemed to have father's Louisiana domicile).
47, State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934).
48. See. e.g., Milner v. Gatlin. 139 Ga. 109. 76 S.E. 860 (1912); Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946, 96 P.2d 849
(1939); Beale. The Progress of the Law 1910-1920, 34 HARv. L. REv. 50, 58-59 (1920).
49. See Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 42 (1940) (urging
courts to avoid technical concept of domicile). One commentator colorfully described the dilemma facing the
judge in a child custody dispute:
To a judge faced with this intensely practical situation, speculations over the niceties or domicile, of
distinctions between jurisdiction in personam and in rem, and, in the latter case, whether the res to be
dealt with is the child's status or his corporal person, must seem as irrelevant to the matter in hand as a
stratospheric flight to the domestic problems of an earthworm.
Stansbury. Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 819, 823 (1944).
50. See, e.g., Stumberg, supra note 49, at 55-56.
51. See. e.g., Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205. 285 P. 606 (1930); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 225, 186 A.
I, 3 (1936); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). See generally Rheinstein, Jurisdiction in
Matters of Child Custody: An Analysis of the Boardman and White Cases, 26 CONN. B.J. 48, 63-64 (1952).
52. See. e.g., DeKraft v. Barney, 30 F. Cas. 1069 (1862) (absent parent received no notice of divorce and
custody proceeding); Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928) (child withheld from mother's cus-
tody against mother's will, and child not present in rendering jurisdiction): Sanders v. Sanders. 223 Mo. App. 834,
14 S.W.2d 458 (1929) (child in custody of nonresident defendant, outside rendering state); Carter v. Carter, 201
Ga. 850. 41 S.E.2d 532 (1947) (child's brief presence in forum state obtained surreptitiously). Professor Rhein-
stein took the position early on that a binding custody decree could not be entered against a parent by any court
that did not have personal jurisdiction over that parent. See Rheinstein, supra note 51, at 63-65.
53. See Weber, 200 Ind. 448. 163 N.E. 269; Sanders, 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458: Boens v. Bennett,
20 Cal. App. 2d 477, 67 P.2d 715 (1937): Byers v. Superior Court, 61 Ariz. 284, 148 P.2d 999 (1944); Stansbury,
supra note 49. at 827.
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entered against a parent by any court that did not have personal jurisdiction
over that parent.54
Thus, the common-law tradition regarding child custody jurisdiction was
mixed. Many courts took the position that jurisdiction to determine custody de-
rived from the child's contacts with the forum state, whether framed in terms of
domicile, residence, or presence. Where such connections were missing, or were
obtained fraudulently, the amenability of the absent contestant to personal ju-
risdiction became pivotal.
Courts began articulating alternative bases of jurisdiction in the mid-twen-
tieth century. In Sampsell v. Superior Court,55 then-Associate Justice Traynor
canvassed the common-law approaches and concluded that three theories of ju-
risdiction over child custody existed: in personam jurisdiction over the child's
parents; jurisdiction over "status," based on the child's domicile; and jurisdic-
tion based on the child's presence.5" Instead of designating any single theory as
the exclusive jurisdictional test, Traynor endorsed the three theories as alterna-
tive bases of jurisdiction:
[T]here is no reason to attempt to arrive at some basis for jurisdiction that should
be accepted as final and conclusive in all states. It is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
that the state "has a substantial interest in the welfare of the child or in the preserva-
tion of the family unit of which he is a part .... "5
That judicial lenience regarding custody jurisdiction was later endorsed by
the American Law Institute.5 The flexible jurisdictional approach to child cus-
tody, when combined with the doctrine that custody decrees are modifiable,
nonfinal orders and therefore not entitled to full faith and credit, 9 led to pro-
longed litigation in different states, inconsistent court decrees, and a troubling
discontinuity for children. 60 Indeed, the law as it stood before the adoption of
the UCCJA and the PKPA fairly invited kidnapping.
2. Jurisdiction to Determine Status
The early common-law reliance on the child's domicile for custody jurisdic-
tion derived, in part, from the theory that the custody determination was a de-
termination of status.6" Many modern courts, relying on assertions in the com-
mentary to the UCCJA, 2 have likewise embraced the status doctrine, reasoning
that personal jurisdiction is unnecessary because child custody determinations
54. See. e.g., Rheinstein, supra note 51, at 63-65.
55. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
56. Id. at 779, 197 P.2d at 748-49.
57. Id. at 780, 197 P.2d at 750 (quoting Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines. 10
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. at 831).
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 79 (1971) (listing child's domicile, child's presence, and
parents' amenability to personal jurisdiction as alternative bases for custody jurisdiction). The ALl recently, how-
ever, adopted a jurisdictional provision paralleling the structure of the PKPA. See id. (Revisions 1989).
59. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947), also discussed infra in note 131 and
accompanying text.
60. See S. KATZ. supra note 3. at I I-15; H. CLARK, supra note 8. at 457-59.
61. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934); Goodrich, supra note 42, at 2.
62. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JuRis. ACT § 12 comment, 9 U.L.A. 274 (1988) ('There is no requirement
for technical personal jurisdiction, on the traditional theory that custody determinations, as distinguished from
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are determinations of a child's familial status, similar to determinations "in
rem." The American Law Institute recently went on record in support of thejurisdictional approach of the UCCJA and the PKPA by eliminating its earlier
provision on custody jurisdiction and substituting a provision that parallels al-
most verbatim the language of the PKPA.6 4 Significantly, the provision appears
under the general heading "Jurisdiction Over Status."65
Clearly, the status theory has attracted many adherents. By definition, it
has provided an escape from the troublesome notion that the constitutional re-
quirement for personal jurisdiction applies to child custody litigation. The appli-
cability of the theory to child custody litigation, however, is problematic.
In Pennoyer v. Neff,66 Justice Field excluded certain matters from his gen-
eral construct of personal jurisdiction. His now-famous caveat was the follow-
ing: "[W]e do not mean to assert, by anything we have said, that a State may
not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards
a non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without
service of process or personal notice to the non-resident."8 He went on to ex-
plain that a person domiciled in a state could seek a divorce from an absent
spouse, even without personal jurisdiction over that spouse, because of the
state's power to determine the civil status of its inhabitants. Field seemed con-
cerned that a contrary construction of state power would leave the stay-at-home
spouse without redress.68
When the Supreme Court endorsed the status exception in Pennoyer, there
was at least some disagreement concerning the validity of the exception. The
status exception to personal jurisdiction in the divorce context was a uniquely
American legal issue,69 and the origins of the exception are ambiguous. One
early commentator wrote that personal jurisdiction was required in divorce pro-
ceedings as a "general matter of law."' 70 In contrast, Joel Bishop, the widely
respected author of several treatises on American law, concluded that a status
support actions .. .. are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status."); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT
§ 13 comment. 9 U.L.A. 277 ("Personal jurisdiction over the [absent parent] is not required.").
63. See, e.g., Warwick v. Gluck, 12 Kan. App. 2d 563, 751 P.2d 1042 (1988); In re Custody of Jackson, 562
So. 2d 1271 (Miss. 1990); Hudson v. Hudson, 35 Wash. App. 822. 670 P.2d 287 (1983); Creavin v. Moloney, 773
S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971) (Revisions 1989).
65. See id. at § 77.
66. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
67. Id. at 734.
68. Given the variation from state to state of the availability of divorce, Field reasoned that a requirement of
personal jurisdiction might absolutely preclude a divorce for some parties. "The complaining party would, there-
fore, fail if a divorce were sought in the State of the defendant; and if application could not be made to the
tribunals of the complainant's domicile in such case, and proceedings be there instituted without personal service
of process or personal notice to the offending party, the injured citizen would be without redress." Id. at 735.
69. Because of the limitations on the authority of the ecclesiastical courts, the status exception could not have
arisen in England. Ecclesiastical courts were limited to divorces a mensa et thoro (divorce from bed and board)
and only Parliament could decree absolute divorces. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *87-103, Maynard v.
Hill. 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888). In exercising their circumscribed powers, the ecclesiastical courts could affect only
those persons actually present within the diocese. See Ditson v. Ditson. 4 R.I. 87, 97 (1856). As Bishop pointed
out, it is doubtful that a separation from bed and board would constitute a determination of "status" as contem-
plated in the exception. 2 J. BIStOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 159 at 139
(1864).
70: J. PROFFATT, WOMAN BEFORE THE LAW 136-37 (1874).
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
exception existed and was supported by natural, international, and municipal
law. 71 Presaging the later rationale relied on by Justice Field in Pen-
noyer, Bishop defended the status exception not only as a matter of
human necessity, but also as a matter of states' rights:
If it were not so, then both States, where the domicile of the one was in the one
State and that of the other was in the other State, would be deprived of the right to
determine the status of their own subjects; each must yield to foreign power in the
management of its domestic concerns.7 1
Drawing on a similar theme of states' rights, some proponents of the status
exception analogized it to theories supporting a state's power to affect the status
of slaves. In an early state court exposition on the exception, 3 the court rea-
soned that the sovereign's right to alter the marital status of people within its
borders was similar to its right to alter the status of a slave.7 ' The state's au-
thority, according to the court, was supported by the change in status that a
slave immediately incurred upon fleeing a slave state and entering a free state.
If this sovereign right to alter status is valid for the partially recognized institu-
tion of slavery, the court wrote, then it must also hold for the universally recog-
nized institution of marriage.75
Significantly, by the mid-nineteenth century, many American states had
statutes authorizing divorce jurisdiction if either spouse were domiciled or resid-
ing in the forum state.76 Such jurisdiction, however, was solely for the purpose
of affecting status and did not compel compliance of any sort from the defend-
ant. As Bishop explained:
Probably the decree is not directly binding upon the person of such subject; unless he
appears and answers to the suit, or at least, has notice of it, served upon his person
within the jurisdiction of the court rendering it. He is not necessarily bound by any
collateral clause in it, as, that he pay alimony; and he only ceases to be a husband,
because he has ceased to have a wife. 77
Thus, at its inception, the status doctrine was narrowly designed to safeguard
state authority in determining civil status. It affected status, but did not "bind"
the defendant to any liability or course of conduct.
71. J. BIsHoP, supra note 69, § 156 at 136-37. Interestingly, the Supreme Court relied on Bishop in its
explanation of the status exception. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735. Bishop, however, cited no case law to support
his statements in the cited section of the treatise. See J. BISHOP, supra note 69, § 156 at 136-37.
72. J. BIsHO, supra note 69, § 156 at 136.
73. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
74. One wonders whether the court's analogy to the institution of slavery reflected the judges' views of
marriage.
75. Ditson, 4 R.I. at 102. Similarly, Bishop quotes an early English case explaining the limitations of the
status exception as it related to slave status:
[lI]n the case of slavery, if the slave be in this country, we would not suffer him to be treated as such;
but if the master should be domiciled here, we could not sustain an action at the instance of the slave, who
was resident in the West Indies. carried on by his mandatory, for declaring his freedom.
J. BISHlO, supra note 69, § 147 at 129 (quoting a case cited as Duntze v. Levett, Ferg. 68, 406. 3 Eng. Ec. 360,
508).
76. See R. TYLER. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INFANCY, INCLUDING GUARDIANSHIP AND CUSTODY OF
INFANTS. AND THE LAW OF COVERTURE, EMBRACING DOWER MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. AND THE STATUTORY
POLICY OF THE SEVERAL STATES IN RESPECT TO HUSBAND AND WIFE 900-01 (1868).
77. J. BISHOP, supra note 69, § 156 at 137.
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The Supreme Court has not had occasion to flesh out the contours of the
status doctrine. Although the Court has long endorsed the constitutional power
of state courts to grant a divorce based on the domicile of one spouse,78 it has
not extended the status theory to other circumstances. In the divorce context,
the power to dissolve the status of marriage arises from the paramount interests
of the state of the petitioning spouse's domicile.79 Those interests outweigh con-
cerns for the affected absent spouse, since no action is compelled of that per-
son.80 Where personal liability or loss of property is at stake, however, the
Court has made clear that personal jurisdiction must exist.8"
The status doctrine received its most recent attention in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner.8 2 That case purportedly held that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe
and its progeny."'8 3 In a footnote, the Court excluded the status exception from
the scope of its holding. Justice Marshall wrote for the majority: "We do not
suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as
the particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with
the standard of fairness." 4 In the same footnote, Marshall cited pages from a
well-known article by then-Associate Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court. 5 In that article, Traynor summarized the jurisdictional law of divorce
and, in part, of child custody and termination of parental rights. Traynor urged
an abandonment of the fictional "res" in constructing a theory of jurisdiction
for familial matters; he would have preferred a more candid assessment of the
parties' contacts, the interests of the concerned states, and the fairness to af-
fected parties. Only after the pages cited by Marshall does Traynor observe that
78. See. e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913). Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942). Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1948). At one time the Court took the position that full faith and
credit was not required to be given to divorce decrees unless the rendering court had personal jurisdiction over
both spouses. see Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). but that limitation was abandoned in Williams.
79. In Estin. for example, the Court explained:
The interest of the State extends to its domiciliaries. The State should have the power to guard its
interest in them by changing or altering their marital status and by protecting them in that changed status
throughout the farthest reaches of the nation. . . . [The risks of bigamy charges or illegitimacy] are
matters of legitimate concern to the State of the domicile. They entitle the State of the domicile to bring
in the absent spouse through constructive service. In no other way could the State of the domicile have
and maintain effective control of the marital status of its domiciliaries.
Estin, 334 U.S. at 546-47.
80. See Traynor, supra note 39. at 661 ("[A] defendant's purposeless interest in barricading the plaintiffs
avenue to freedom is overwhelmingly outweighed by the plaintiffs purposeful interest in securing freedom....
[T]he dubious interest of defendant's state in perpetuating a broken marriage in limbo is overwhelmingly out-
weighed by the forum state's major interest in the orderly resolution of a plaintiff domiciliary's marital status.").
81. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957) ("It
has long been the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.").
82. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
83. Id. at 212. The Scalia plurality in Burnham qualified that pronouncement considerably to apply only to
suits against absent nonresidents. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 (1990).
84. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
85. Id. (citing Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657, 660-61 (1959)).
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"the state where a child is present must be competent to regulate his custody
whether his parent is present or not ... -86
Traynor's main point was to recommend that the old terminologies be
abandoned in place of more realistic and flexible analyses. His focus on, and
justification of, the ex parte divorce was probably the basis of the Supreme
Court's citation in Shaffer. It seems unlikely that the Court intended, by its
citation, to communicate approval of an extension of the status exception to
child custody determinations.87
Not surprisingly, courts and commentators have disagreed as to the proper
application of the status exception, some maintaining that it applies to the cus-
tody determination,88 and others positing that it better fits the state-dominated
proceedings of parental rights terminations.89 Those theorists who have applied
the status doctrine to the custody determination have reasoned that child cus-
tody litigation, like the dissolution of a marriage, is a simple determination of
civil status, or a proceeding in rem. 0
The late Professor Bodenheimer asserted that "status adjudications based
on specialized jurisdictional rules meet due process requirements of fairness
without the need for minimal contacts of the defendant with the forum." ' Such
an approach, however, has been justifiably criticized as simplistic, because it
ignores the different human relationships, legal consequences, and governmental
interests involved in child custody disputes, on the one hand, and divorce pro-
ceedings, on the other.92
I favor a restrictive view of the status doctrine, one which does not extend
to the child custody domain. In Justice Field's original construct of territorial
jurisdiction, he relied on two propositions of "public law." Those principles, pur-
portedly rooted in European international law, were that "every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its terri-
tory," and that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory."9' 3 The first principle, in particular,
86. Traynor. supra note 39, at 662 (citing Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948)
(child custody jurisdiction may rest on child's presence or domicile, as alternatives to personal jurisdiction over
absent parent)).
87. Accord Coombs, supra note 8, at 743-44.
88. See authorities cited supra note 63.
89. See, e.g., Stansbury, supra note 49, at 820. For a case extending the status exception to the context of a
parental rights termination, see In re M.S.B., D.G.B., & K.R.B., 611 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
90. See, e.g., Goodrich, supra note 42. at 2-3 ("It would seem, though it is not an open and shut proposition.
that the award of the custody of children in a divorce suit is an adjudication affecting status and so properly made
only where the child is domiciled, and where, it would seem, the parent to whom the child is awarded is domi-
ciled."); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 12 comment, 9 U.L.A. 274 (1988) ("There is no requirement for
technical personal jurisdiction, on the traditional theory that custody determinations, as distinguished from sup-
port actions . . . .are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status.").
91. Bodenheimer & Neely-Kvarme, supra note 16, at 240. The authors also urged a broad application of the
status exception to such proceedings as guardianship, termination of parental rights, and adoptions. Id.
92. See Coombs, supra note 8. at 742-45.
93. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). Professor Hazard has convincingly shown that Field's restate-
ment of international law, taken from W. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834). was mis-
conceived. See Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 252-72. Never-
theless, Field's precepts became the law of Pennoyer, informing much of the reasoning in the case, and must be
relied on in interpreting other pronouncements in Pennoyer.
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gave rise to the status exception for divorce. As Justice Field explained, every
state has "the power to determine for itself the civil status of its inhabitants."94
The second principle, however, necessarily limited the scope of that power to
affect status. Under its command, a state could not directly control persons
outside the state. Thus, the two principles together suggest that Field's notion of
jurisdiction to affect status did not include the power to compel conduct of per-
sons beyond the territorial borders of the state.
The pivotal focus, in Justice Field's original conception of the status theory,
seemed to be the ability of a court to adjust civil status without the necessity of
another party's presence. Indeed, Justice Field was prepared to dispense with
notice to the absent person: "[W]e do not mean to assert, by anything we have
said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one
of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the State,
though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resi-
dent."'95 Although the ease with which Field would have disregarded notice is
jarring to our modern notions of due process, the statement does reveal that he
had in mind a legal determination that did not require cooperation from an
adverse party. In the classic status case, that of divorce, a decree's enforceabil-
ity against the responding party is immaterial for a simple reason: a decree that
dissolves a marriage is incapable of being disobeyed. A responding party may be
unhappy with the outcome, but she or he cannot "violate" the granting of a
divorce.
In the child custody context, by contrast, the decree determining custodial
rights may be violated through the taking or concealment of a child; the with-
holding of a child; the failure to comply with visitation; or other forms of inter-
ference with, or non-performance of, custodial rights and duties. Courts have
long recognized that rights established pursuant to a child custody decree are
enforceable by contempt. 6 The contempt power exists to enforce personal or-
ders (generally of an equitable nature), and the court's authority depends, in
part, on authority over the person.97 Thus, where a court seeks to issue binding
personal orders, and to enforce those orders by contempt, the court must have a
basis for asserting power over the individual who is the subject of the order. In
this sense, the child custody decree, with its typical array of orders to the par-
ties, is unlike the divorce decree, in which the dissolution of the marriage takes
place at the moment the decree is rendered.9
94. Pennoyer. 95 U.S. at 722.
95. Id. at 734.
96. See H. CLARK, supra note 8. at 848-49. As Professor Clark points out, courts invoke civil contempt
powers as a device for coercing compliance with a custody order, and they can invoke criminal contempt powers to
punish past violations of an order. See also Hicks v. Feiock. 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
97. See. e.g.. D. DoBBs. REMEDIES 87 (1973) ("in addition to having jurisdiction over the class of case
involved, the court must obtain jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (or his property) if it is to render a
valid decree,").
98. The divorce decree, of course, is rarely unaccompanied by other incidental orders affecting property and
support rights. Long-standing jurisdictional doctrine, however, holds that the divorce court must have a basis other
than the claimant's domicile to impose personal liability on the defending party. See H. CLARK, supra note 8, at
451.
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To the extent the status doctrine makes sense, it should apply only to con-
troversies in which the civil status of one or more of the parties is the sole issue
and in which that status can be decreed without regard to the post-decree con-
duct of the parties. In such cases, the domicile in the forum state of at least one
of the persons whose status is being affected would seem sufficient, under the
traditional theory of the status exception, to justify the court's power.
In contrast to the court's role in a simple divorce action, the child custody
court needs territorial jurisdiction to support the assertion of power over each
contestant, since the resulting decree in such a dispute will compel the parties to
act in a particular way. In such a context, literal use of the status exception
seems misplaced. The exception connotes that authority over the opposing party
is irrelevant and invites exclusive reliance on the technical concept of the child's
domicile.
A better theoretical approach would be to recognize that some territorial
affiliation between the child and the forum, or the opposing contestant and the
forum, is necessary before the custody court can resolve the dispute before it.
That affiliation, at a constitutional minimum, may include domicile of the child,
presence of the child, or other kinds of child-centered connections, or the ame-
nability of the opposing contestant to personal jurisdiction. Although the status
theory, as applied to child custody, may also turn on a child-centered connec-
tion, the status terminology belies the forward-looking injunctive nature of the
custody court's decree.
C. Contributions from the Supreme Court
Before the widespread adoption of the UCCJA, the Supreme Court had
created a two-edged dilemma for participants in interstate child custody dis-
putes. First, the Court's decision in May v. Anderson seemed to require per-
sonal jurisdiction in the rendering court before a sister state would be required
to give whatever recognition was due under the full faith and credit clause. The
May holding suggested, by implication, that enforcement in the rendering state
would be a violation of due process as well. Second, apart from May, several
Court pronouncements indicated that full faith and credit is inapplicable to the
typically modifiable, non-final child custody award.99
1. May v. Anderson
The May decision, frequently ignored or rationalized into irrelevance 00 but
occasionally followed,"0" warrants close attention. In May, the mother and fa-
ther lived in Wisconsin with their three children. 0 2 When marital difficulties
arose, the mother moved to Ohio with the children. Shortly after his wife and
children left, the father filed for divorce in Wisconsin and petitioned for custody
99. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
100. See H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 462 nn.61-63.
101. See. e.g.. Exparte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984). See also cases cited in H. CLARK, supra note 8.
at 462 nn.58-59.
102. All facts arc taken from the Supreme Court's statement of facts. May. 345 U.S. at 529-32.
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of the children. The mother was served with process in Ohio, but, significantly,
no long-arm statute in Wisconsin authorized such service. The mother did not
appear in the Wisconsin proceeding. The Wisconsin court ultimately granted
the divorce and awarded custody of the children to the father.
The enforceability of the Wisconsin decree eventually came before the
Ohio courts when the mother refused to return the children after a visitation.
The Ohio court ruled that it was obliged by the full faith and credit clause to
accept the Wisconsin decree as binding on the mother.
In the Supreme Court, the mother fared better. Justice Burton, writing for
four justices,1 0 3 framed the issue as follows:
[Wihether a court of a state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor pre-
sent, may cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and compan-
ionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in personam. Rights
far more precious to appellant than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound
by the Wisconsin award of custody.104
Reasoning that "a mother's right to custody of her children is a personal right
entitled to at least as much protection as her right to alimony,"100 the Court
held that the Wisconsin decree was not binding on the mother, and was not
entitled to recognition in Ohio.
Justice Burton expressly rejected the argument that the children's technical
domicile was in Wisconsin and that Wisconsin therefore had a sufficient basis
for entering a binding custody decree. He wrote, "[w]e find it unnecessary to
determine the children's legal domicile because, even if it be with their father,
that does not give Wisconsin, certainly as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction
that it must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to their
immediate possession."100
Burton's language, and the cases on which he relied, suggest that the chil-
dren's residence or presence in Wisconsin at the time of the decree might have
made a difference.' 07 Although he did not develop the point, one reading of
103. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the judgment; Justices Jackson, Reed, and Minton dissented; and Jus-
tice Clark did not participate. See May, 345 U.S. at 535, 536, 542. With the Court thus divided 4-1-3, Justice
Burton's ambiguous "plurality" opinion has uncertain preeedential weight. See, e.g., Bodenheimer & Neely-
Kvarme, supra note 16. at 248; Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MtcH. L. REv. 795, 803-07
(1964).
104. May. 345 U.S. at 533.
105. Id. at 534. Justice Jackson strongly criticized the majority's reliance on jurisdictional theories relating
to property rights. He argued that a court's ultimate concern with the welfare of the child distinguished the child
custody dispute from the ordinary property-centered litigation. See id. at 540-41.
106. Id. at 534.
107. See id. at 535 n.8 (citing %Veber v. Redding. 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928) (divorce court could
not determine custody of children who were not within the jurisdiction of the court where opposing parent was
nonresident of forum, and had not been personally served nor entered appearance); Sanders v. Sanders. 223 Mo.
App. 834. 14 S.W.2d 458 (1929) (court lacked jurisdiction to determine custody where opposing parent was
nonresident and children had never been inforun state); Carter v. Carter, 201 Ga. 850. 41 S.E.2d 532 (1947)
(custody jurisdiction did not exist where child was surreptitiously taken to forum state and court awarded perma-
nent custody to father 3 days after child's arrival)). The cases cited by the Court leave open the possibility that
the children's presence or domicile, unless fraudulently obtained, would support custody jurisdiction without re-
gard to the existence of personal jurisdiction over the absent parent. Indeed, in Weber, the court noted that even if
the original custody decree were deemed valid, the state of the child's present domicile would have the power to
determine custody anew, if necessary. Weber, 200 Ind. at 455, 163 N.E. at 271.
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
May is that alternative bases for establishing territorial jurisdiction in the cus-
tody context exist. Judicial authority over the absent contestant is necessary,
but that authority can arise from child-centered contacts (residence or physical
presence of the child in the forum) or the amenability of the absent parent to
personal jurisdiction in the forum.
In an obvious attempt to limit the impact of the holding, Justice Frank-
furter, concurring, wrote that the Court had decided only that the full faith and
credit clause did not require Ohio to accept the Wisconsin decree.0 8 He ob-
served, however, that Ohio could as a matter of local law recognize the Wiscon-
sin ruling without offending due process.109
Justice Frankfurter's analysis does not withstand scrutiny. The plurality's
premise in May was that territorial jurisdiction over the absent parent was con-
stitutionally required as a matter of personal right, and it cited with approval
the trio of state cases holding that custody orders entered in the absence of such
jurisdiction were void. 10 Under Justice Burton's analysis, the Wisconsin decree
was not entitled to recognition under the full faith and credit clause because the
Wisconsin court lacked the requisite territorial jurisdiction over the mother.
Constitutionally invalid judgments, of course, cannot be given recognition with-
out violating the due process clause." 1 Thus, Frankfurter's attempt to cabin the
case within the confines of full faith and credit while leaving the states room to
escape the holding through comity is problematic. His theory may have been
convenient, but it does not successfully avoid the apparent import of the plural-
ity's opinion.
Justice Burton's opinion does suggest, however, that the Court was con-
cerned, in part, with the lack of effective service of process on the mother. He
noted that
[t]he only service of process upon [the mother] consisted of the delivery to her person-
ally, in Ohio, of a copy of the Wisconsin summons and petition. Such service is au-
thorized by a Wisconsin statute for use in an action for a divorce but that statute
makes no mention of its availability in a proceeding for the custody of children. 2
Another possible construction of the case, then, is that Wisconsin had simply
failed to enact a long-arm statute tailored for child custody litigation. Such a
concern might seem trivial today, but in the era of May, decided only seven
years after International Shoe Co. v. Washington,11 3 the concept of extraterrito-
rial power of state courts was still very new. Thus, if Wisconsin would have had
an applicable long-arm statute in place, the Court might have decided the case
differently. The plurality's concern with service of process indicates that the
lack of a formal, legislatively sanctioned assertion of state power over the de-
fendant may have been crucial.
108. May. 345 U.S. at 535.
109. Id. at 535-36.
110. Id. at 535 n.8 (citing Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928); Sanders v. Sanders. 223
Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458 (1929); Carter v. Carter, 201 Ga. 850, 41 S.E.2d 532 (1947)).
I11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877).
112. May, 345 U.S. at 530-31.
113. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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The Supreme Court has not again squarely addressed the question involved
in May, but it has cited the case with apparent approval in dicta. In Stanley v.
Illinois,'" the Court cited May for the nonjurisdictional proposition that the
right to have and raise a family is "more precious than property rights."'' 15 In
the same case, however, the Court suggested that under certain circumstances,
state court hearings on parental fitness could proceed without personal service
on the absent father." 6 In particular, the Court seemed concerned with cases
involving an unwed father whose identity or location is unknown. 1 7 The Court's
cursory suggestion in Stanley has led some to conclude that personal jurisdic-
tion is not required in parental fitness hearings or, by extension, in child custody
litigation.""
Such a reading misses the mark. Stanley's brief allusion to service of pro-
cess was situated in a footnote explaining that the hearing required as a matter
of due process would not unduly burden the state. The majority wanted to en-
sure that the unknown unwed father would not pose an insurmountable barrier
to the state's ability to protect the child. That the Court was willing to dispense
with service in instances where service is impossible does not mean that service
can be dispensed with in all circumstances."19 Indeed, Stanley should not be
read for any jurisdictional significance, since jurisdiction was not in issue in the
case.
The Supreme Court cited May in Kulko v. Superior Court"0 in a manner
of ambiguous approval. In bolstering its conclusion in Kulko that the assertion
of personal jurisdiction in the California support action over the New York fa-
ther would be unfair, the Court wrote, "It is [the father] who has remained in
the State of the marital domicile, whereas it is [the mother] who has moved
across the continent."' 2 ' To support this statement, the Kulko Court cited a
footnote in May addressing the authority of a divorce court to determine cus-
tody when the children are not within the jurisdiction of the court, the defend-
ant is not a resident of the forum state, and the defendant has not been person-
ally served and has not appeared.' 2  Thus, the Kulko majority may have
believed that May's basic holding rested in part on considerations of fairness to
the absent parent and in part on the children's absence from the forum.
May v. Anderson had a greater impact in the years following its decision
than it has today. Contemporaneous observers, writing before the widespread
adoption of the UCCJA, concluded that the rule of May significantly exacer-
bated the problem of unenforceability of child custody decrees outside the ren-
114. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
115. Id. at 651.
116. Id. at 657 n.9.
117. Id. (noting with approval that state law governing procedures in juvenile cases provided for notice by
publication when personal or mail service could "not be had").
118. See, e.g., H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 462; Bodenheimer & Neely-Kvarme, supra note 16. at 242-43.
119. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
120. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
121. Id. at 97 (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534-35 n.8 (1953)).
122. May, 345 U.S. at 535 n.8 (citing Weber v. Redding, 208 Ind. 448. 163 N.E. 269 (1928); Sanders v.
Sanders. 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458 (1929); Carter v. Carter, 201 Ga. 850, 41 S.E.2d 532 (1947)).
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dering state.12 3 Professor Clark has noted that in the decades following May,
the requirement of personal jurisdiction in custody cases was left in a "highly
confused and confusing condition."'1 24 In today's era of the UCCJA and the
PKPA, on the other hand, many (but not all) state courts have read May to
mean very little .
25
2. Interstate Recognition
The May holding only worsened an already unsettled world for child cus-
tody litigants. Custody orders hold a peculiar status under the full faith and
credit clause 126 because they are typically subject to modification in the best
interests of the child.'2 7 Some courts have reasoned that custody orders, neces-
sarily subject to revision in the future on a showing of changed circumstances,
are not "final" judgments entitled to recognition under the clause.12 8 Courts
have also explained that even if a custody order were deemed "final" under the
full faith and credit clause, the clause and its implementing statute1 2 9 require
only that courts give the same recognition to an out-of-state judgment that the
judgment would receive in the courts of the rendering state. 30 Thus, if a cus-
tody decree were subject to modification in the rendering court, the courts of a
second state likewise would be entitled to modify the decree.' 3 '
The anomaly of child custody decrees under full faith and credit doctrine,
when juxtaposed with May's apparent requirement of personal jurisdiction over
the absent parent, gave rise to great instability in the world of child custody
litigation. Under May, the decree was unenforceable if rendered without juris-
diction over the opposing contestant. Even if jurisdiction could be obtained, a
parent could not rely on the finality or enforceability of a custody determination
in his or her favor if the decree remained subject to modification. An obvious
incentive existed for parents to disregard unfavorable decrees and to rely on
self-help, the tactic that Justice Jackson, dissenting in May, so aptly labeled
"seize-and-run.'' 32
123. See Hazard, supra note 10, at 384-85 (citing cases relying on May).
124. H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 463.
125. See, e.g.. In re Marriage of Leonard. 122 Cal. App. 3d 443. 452. 175 Cal. Rptr. 903, 907-08 (1981).
Similarly, commentators have often argued that the case should be overruled. See Hazard, supra note 10. at 406:
Murchison, Jurisdiction Over Persons. Things, Status, 41 LA. L. REv. 1053. 1144 (1981).
126. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § I.
127. See generally Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). The Supreme Court was expected to clar-
ify the status of custody decrees under the full faith and credit clause when it granted certiorari in a case in 1982,
but it subsequently dismissed the petition. See Eicke v. Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231 (La. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied,
406 So. 2d 607 (La. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 970 (1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
128. See, e.g.. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 948 (6th Cir. 1985); Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 386 A.2d
366 (1978).
The Supreme Court declined to settle that question in Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192 (1962).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
130. The mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, that "'[s]uch Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... shall have
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . .as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such state . . . from which they are taken," seems to require this result. See. e.g., Thomas v. Washing-
ton Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980). Morris v. Jones. 329 U.S. 545 (1947).
131. See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1947).
132. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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D. The Statutory Solution13 3
1. The UCCJA
Promulgated in 1968, the UCCJA grew out of the desire to bring a mea-
sure of interstate stability to custody awards."3 The Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws recognized that under the common law, several states might assert
authority to determine custody, including the courts of the state where the child
or the parent was domiciled, where the child was physically present, or where a
divorce had been decreed. 135 State courts frequently acted in competition with
one another and issued conflicting decrees."36 The resulting instability and dis-
continuity for parents and children were a growing public concern, one which
the Commissioners addressed, in part, through the formulation of uniform juris-
dictional standards. Other key goals of the UCCJA were to mandate recogni-
tion and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees, to limit a second court's
authority to modify existing decrees, and to encourage the discretionary denial
of jurisdiction where a contestant has engaged in child-snatching or other
wrongful practices."37
Section 3 of the UCCJA sets forth alternative bases of jurisdiction in child
custody litigation. The framework, in the Commissioners' words, "limits custody
jurisdiction to the state where the child has his home or where there are other
strong contacts with the child and his family.""x38 These jurisdictional bases can
be grouped roughly under the headings of "home state," "significant connec-
tion," "emergency," and "residual" jurisdiction." 9 As Section 3 makes clear,
133. In this section I intend only to describe the jurisdictional premises of the UCCJA and the PKPA. The
development of the two statutes, their interrelationship, and their shortcomings have been carefully analyzed by
others. See S. KATZ, supra note 3: Coombs, supra note 8; Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 3;
Bodenheimer. Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 3; Ratner, supra note 8.
134. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. AcT Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 116-17 (1988).
135. Id. at 117; S. KATZ, supra note 3, at 12.
136. See generally Ratner. supra note 103.
137. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURis. ACT Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 117-18 (1988).
138. Id. at 118.
139. Section 3 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make
a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
(I) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii)
had been the child's home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding . . .or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume jurisdiction because (i) the
child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this
State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care. protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child . . . or
(4)(i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accor-
dance with paragraphs (I). (2). or (3). or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the
best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a). physical presence in this State of the
child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of
this State to make a child custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine
his custody.
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the Commissioners modified the various jurisdictional theories prevalent under
the common law. The UCCJA avoids reliance on the technical concept of
"domicile," and expressly limits the jurisdictional significance of the child's
presence. Only for emergency or residual jurisdiction is the child's presence
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and the child's presence is not a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite under the statute. The intended primary bases of jurisdiction
are the prescribed showings for home state and significant-connection jurisdic-
tion.140 The intent underlying the jurisdictional framework was to place jurisdic-
tion with the state most interested in, and most capable of determining, the
child's welfare.' 4'
The Act requires that notice and opportunity to be heard be provided to
the responding contestant, 42 and it includes a provision for extraterritorial ser-
vice of notice. 43 Through the provision of this "long-arm statute," the Commis-
sioners provided a necessary step in establishing power over absent
contestants.144
Significantly, the Commissioners dispensed with the requirement of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the absent parent and expressly endorsed the status ex-
ception. Section 12 of the Act provides that a custody decree rendered in accor-
dance with the standards of Section 3 "binds all parties who have been served in
this State or notified in accordance with section 5 or who have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be
heard."'145 As the comment to that section makes clear, the two requirements
for a binding custody order are jurisdiction under Section 3 and compliance
with due process mandates, without regard to personal jurisdiction over an ab-
sent contestant: "There is no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction, on
the traditional theory that custody determinations, as distinguished from sup-
port actions . . . are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status."' 6
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 143-44 (1988).
140. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 3 comment, 9 U.L.A. 144 (1988).
141. The Commissioners relied heavily on Professor Ratner's influential analysis of the problem. See
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the
Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1217 (1969). Professor Bodenheimer, Reporter for the Act, explained
that "[The] Committee was aided by Professor Leonard Ratner, who surveyed the field and pointed the way in his
monumental study entitled 'Child Custody in a Federal System' and in a draft of a proposed uniform law" (refer-
ring to Ratner. supra note 103). In his study, Professor Ratner argued that access to relevant evidence should be a
paramount factor in any jurisdictional theory. Id. at 809. Specifically, he urged that "Itihe court most likely to
make a correct decision is the court having greatest access to the relevant evidence, and that court usually will be
located in the state where the child has an established home-an established home being the last place where the
child has lived with a parent for sufficient time to become integrated into the community." Id. at 815.
Interestingly, Professor Ratner more recently has criticized the UCCJA's adoption of the "significant connec-
tion" jurisdictional standard as being highly subjective and capable of expansive interpretation. See Ratner, supra
note 8, at 391-92. He also faults the Commissioners for their failure to eliminate the problem of concurrent
jurisdiction. Id.
142. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT §§ 4 & 5, 9 U.L.A. 208, 212 (1988).
143. Id. at § 5. That section provides in pertinent part: "Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over
a person outside this State shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and may be [by
the various described methods]." (Emphasis added).
144. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text, discussing the significance in May v. Anderson of Wis-
consin's failure to enact an applicable long-arm statute.
145. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. AcT § 12, 9 U.L.A. 274 (1988).
146. Id. at § 12, comment, 9 U.L.A. 274-75.
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Similarly, in Section 13, the UCCJA requires recognition of custody de-
crees from other states when such decrees have been rendered in accordance
with the Act or under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional stan-
dards of the Act.147 In explaining once again that personal jurisdiction was not
part of the statutory standard, the Commissioners wrote:
Recognition is accorded to a decree which is valid and binding under section 12.
This means, for example, that a court in the state where the father resides will recog-
nize and enforce a custody decree rendered in the home state where the child lives
with the mother if the father was duly notified and given enough time to appear in the
proceedings. Personal jurisdiction over the father is not required.148
Professor Bodenheimer elaborated on the jurisdictional theory underlying
the UCCJA in an article published contemporaneously with the promulgation
of the Act.1 49 She explained that the Commissioners adopted Justice Frank-
furter's interpretation of the holding in May v. Anderson because any other
reading would have caused insurmountable difficulties for the drafters in creat-
ing a workable interstate custody law. 50 In her view, Sections 12 and 13 of the
Act can be justified on alternative grounds: first, the traditional notion that cus-
tody determinations are proceedings affecting status, or, second, "an evolving
theory that minimum contacts of the state with the matter in litigation com-
bined with fairness to the parties permit state judicial action binding on persons
beyond its territorial limits." '151 As the comments to the UCCJA reveal, the
status exception was the justification that the Commissioners chose to
articulate.
2. The PKPA
In the late 1970s, many states had not yet adopted the UCCJA, and many
of those that had adopted it included material variations from the uniform ver-
sion. 152 As a result, many observers believed that a federal law was the only
means of ensuring uniform interstate recognition of custody decrees. In enacting
the PKPA, Congress relied on its authority to implement the full faith and
credit clause, and the main problem Congress sought to remedy was the inappli-
cability of full faith and credit to custody determinations. 153 The purposes of the
Act, as identified by Congress in the statute itself, include the promotion of
interstate cooperation, the interstate enforcement of custody decrees, and the
avoidance of interstate jurisdictional competition and conflict. 154
147. Id. at § 13, 9 U.L.A. 276.
148. Id. at § 13, comment, 9 U.L.A. 277.
149. See Bodenheimer. supra note 141.
150. Id. at 1232-33.
151. Id. at 1233.
152. See S. KATZ. supra note 3, at 32-33.
153. See Joint Hearing, supra note 3, at 48 (statement of Deputy Attorney General Michel), id., Addendum
at 138-39 (Section-by-Section Analysis by Sen. Wallop) (S. 105 requires "'state courts to give full faith and credit
to custody determinations rendered by sister state courts" and bill might induce all states to adopt UCCJA): see
generally Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180-86 (1988).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982) (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose).
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The PKPA requires interstate recognition and enforcement of custody de-
crees that are entered in accordance with the jurisdictional standards of the
Act, and those standards roughly parallel the basic jurisdictional scheme of the
UCCJA. Consistent with the Commissioners' goal in the UCCJA, Congress
hoped to ensure that "a determination of custody and visitation is rendered in
the State which can best decide the case in the interest of the child."' 155 The
most important variation between the jurisdictional schemes of the two statutes
concerns the availability of "significant connection" jurisdiction.1 56 Under the
literal terms of the UCCJA, a state may exercise significant connection jurisdic-
tion even if a home state, as defined in the Act, exists at the same time.157 In
contrast, the PKPA authorizes "significant connection" jurisdiction only when
there is no state qualifying as the child's home state.158 That variation has pro-
voked numerous criticisms from academic corners,'159 and has produced the un-
desirable result that some custody decrees may comply with the standards of
the UCCJA but not with the standards of the PKPA. If, for example, State A
is the child's home state, but the child and one parent have a significant connec-
tion with State B, sufficient to satisfy UCCJA Section 3(a)(2), a custody decree
from State B would be entitled to recognition under the UCCJA, but recogni-
tion would not be mandated under the PKPA. Federal law, in other words,
would allow State A to entertain a second custody action regarding the same
child. As a practical matter, the attractiveness of a federal mandate for inter-
state recognition should lead most courts to attempt to comply with the PKPA
at the initial stages.
The PKPA does not require personal jurisdiction over the absent parent for
interstate recognition of child custody decrees. Testimony during congressional
hearings on the PKPA addressed the problem posed by the personal jurisdiction
doctrine, and various potential resolutions of the problem were proposed.' 60 The
155. Id. at § 1738A (c)(1).
156. The PKPA differs from the UCCJA in other respects that are not material to the focus of this Article.
For example, the PKPA, but not the UCCJA, explicitly provides for continuing jurisdiction in a state once a
custody determination has been made, so long as the state continues to have jurisdiction under its own law and
remains the residence of the child or any contestant. See id. § 1738A(d). In contrast, the UCCJA recognizes
continuing jurisdiction only indirectly, through the limitation on a court's authority to modify a custody decree
from another state. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIs. ACT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988). Such variations, while
creating potential problems for the courts in interpreting the two statutes, do not directly involve the question
whether a valid and enforceable custody decree may be constitutionally rendered without personal jurisdiction
over the absent parent.
157. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURIS. ACT § 3(a)(2) and comment, 9 U.L.A. 143-44 (1988). Professor
Bodenheimer argued, however, that the UCCJA creates a preference for home state jurisdiction, such that signifi-
cant connection jurisdiction becomes available only if there is no home state, or the ties of another state are equal
to or stronger than the family's ties with the home state. Bodenheimer, supra note 141, at 1226. See also
Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody. supra note 3, at 204-05 (arguing that there is exclusive continuing jurisdiction
in the initial home state). However, her position is not supported by the language of Section 3.
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B).
159. See. e.g., H. CLARK, supra note 8, at 480-81, Foster. supra note 8. at 300-04.
160. See. e.g.. Joint Hearing, supra note 3, at 151-52 (Statement of Professor Coombs) (urging that the
contacts required under the jurisdictional guidelines of S. 105 would be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
over an absent parent, or, alternatively, that the statute itself can withstand constitutional challenge even if en-
forcement of a custody decree might be prohibited on due process/personal jurisdiction grounds in individual
case); id. Addendum at 138-40 (Section-by-Section Analysis by Sen. Wallop) (explaining that S. 105 adopts
jurisdictional approach of UCCJA).
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statute does not endorse any particular view, but clearly requires interstate rec-
ognition and enforcement of custody determinations that satisfy its jurisdic-
tional guidelines, without regard to a finding of "minimum contacts" or other
bases for personal jurisdiction over the absent parent."8'
In sum, neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA uses the terminology of "per-
sonal jurisdiction," and neither statute on its face requires a finding of personal
jurisdiction over the opposing contestant. Instead, the statutes define "jurisdic-
tion" to determine custody by reference to child-centered contacts with the fo-
rum state. As courts and commentators have noted, the imposition of a "mini-
mum contacts" standard of personal jurisdiction upon the existing statutory
jurisdictional premises would severely undermine the statutes' effectiveness.16 2
II. FINDING A WAY OUT OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Pitfalls of Existing Theories
The dilemma posed by the jurisdictional holding in May v. Anderson
should be clear. If contemporary concepts of personal jurisdiction apply to the
child custody context, the goals and philosophy of the UCCJA and PKPA will
be substantially undermined. In particular, the state with personal jurisdiction
over the absent parent might have little contact with the child. A familiar sce-
nario in the cases, for example, involves a post-separation move by one parent
and child to a new state, with the other parent remaining in the first state. After
the passage of six or more months, the second state would have presumptive
jurisdiction as the home state under the UCCJA (assuming no wrongdoing by
the parent with physical custody), and any decree it might issue would be enti-
tled to enforcement under the PKPA. The absence of personal jurisdiction over
the stay-at-home parent, however, would create a constitutional obstacle to en-
forcement of the decree, in the forum state or elsewhere, under Justice Burton's
analysis in May. In today's mobile society, moreover, the "stay-at-home" parent
may have moved to a third state, one with which the child has had no contact
whatsoever. If that state is deemed the only state with power to determine cus-
tody, the UCCJA's attempt to place jurisdiction with the most interested state
would be blocked.
161. Professor Coombs advanced an original interpretation of the PKPA, theorizing that where the states
with home state, significant connection, emergency, or continuing jurisdiction lacked minimum contacts with the
absent parent, then residual jurisdiction should become available wherever minimum contacts did exist. See Joint
Hearing. supra note 3, at 152 (Statement of Professor Coombs). He felt that such a construction "produces the
commendable result that paragraph (D) [providing for residual jurisdiction] can be utilized whenever no state
having adequate contacts with the respondent can satisfy any of paragraphs (A) through (C) and (E)." Id. See
also Coombs. supra note 8, at 740-41 (urging a similar construction of Section 3 of the UCCJA). Coombs's
construction of the PKPA, however, according to his own admission, is "less than obvious." Joint Hearing. supra
note 3, at 152. and has not had widespread acceptance in the courts. See. e.g., Ex Porte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733
(Ala. 1984) (in challenge to Florida custody decree for lack of personal jurisdiction, Alabama court reasoned that
neither PKPA nor UCCJA authorized Florida's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident; in absence
of applicable long-arm statute, decree was unenforceable).
162. See, e.g.. In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 457-58, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903. 911 (1981)
(requirement of personal jurisdiction would "emasculate" UCCJA); Bodenheimer & Neely-Kvarme, supra note
16. at 239 (application of minimum contacts doctrine would frustrate many custody disputes and leave many
children homeless).
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The "problem" of May v. Anderson was almost buried by the drafters of
the UCCJA. The Commissioners' explicit reliance on the status exception to
personal jurisdiction has a convenient appeal, but the status exception, upon
examination, does not seem to support the judicial authority necessary for deter-
minations of custody.'6 3 The status exception to personal jurisdiction is, by defi-
nition, an "exception." Apart from its questionable origins and uncertain
dimensions, the exception implies that territorial jurisdiction is not required for
judicial competence in the particular action. The exception makes sense where a
court is truly declaring civil status, without regard to the post-decree conduct of
any opposing party. In the child custody domain, however, power to bind the
opposing parent is essential to the court's ability to render effective relief.
The theory, popular in the state courts, that child custody litigation re-
quires "subject-matter jurisdiction," but not "personal jurisdiction," is likewise
unconvincing."" The dichotomy eliminates one-half of the judicial competence
equation by subsuming the territorial requirements of the UCCJA into the cate-
gory of subject-matter jurisdiction. A more workable view is that a court with
competence over a child custody dispute must have the power to enforce its
judgment, including the power to compel compliance with its orders. The term
"territorial jurisdiction" denotes that power.
Contemporary scholars who have concluded that personal jurisdiction is a
constitutional requirement for child custody litigation have generally argued
that a flexible theory of "mimimum contacts" should be applied. 165 Professor
Russell Coombs, for example, has argued that the individual and state interests
implicated in custody litigation (particularly the state's concern for the welfare
of the child) support the use of less rigorous due process standards. 166 He rea-
sons that courts should respect not only the individual and institutional interests
that the Supreme Court has recognized as relevant to the personal jurisdiction
equation but should also give some deference to the state and federal statutes
adopted to advance those interests in the custody context. "If courts do so," he
has written, "they will sustain custody jurisdiction exercised consistently with
the U.C.C.J.A. and the [PKPA] in all but extreme cases in which courts adju-
dicate the rights of defendants lacking significant contacts with the forum with-
out real justification."'167
In contrast, Professor Ratner has argued that a revamped law of personal
jurisdiction would be satisfied by the UCCJA's concept of the child's "estab-
lished home."' 168 He maintains that personal jurisdiction jurisprudence should
be redrawn to avoid notions of territorial power and to focus on the values of
effective litigation (e.g., convenience of forum, forum's access to evidence, and
reduced litigant harassment).' 69 His resolution is to modify the UCCJA to ac-
163. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
165. See. e.g., Coombs, supra note 8, at 752-64; Ratner. supra note 8, at 419-22; Garfield, supra note 13, at
476-79; Blakesley, supra note 4, at 346-49; Lewis, supra note 15, at 54-59.
166. Coombs, supra note 8. at 752-56.
167. Id. at 764.
168. Ratner, supra note 8, at 419-22.
169. Id. at 414, 420.
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commodate more faithfully a personal jurisdiction theory based on effective-
litigation values. For example, he would abandon the significant connection ju-
risdictional standard and other provisions of the UCCJA that he believes rest on
outdated notions of territoriality. 70
The admirable work of such scholars has contributed greatly to our think-
ing on the question of judicial power to determine child custody. Nevertheless,
their concerns derive, in part, from an application of due process/personal juris-
diction standards, as they have been developed in the context of suits seeking
money or property, to the child custody context. Even Professor Ratner would
apply a redefined, but generally governing, due process formulation to the cus-
tody context.' 7 ' A flexible due process standard, however, is an unpredictable
due process standard, one that will call into question the enforceability of cus-
tody decrees where the absent parent has little or no contact with the forum. As
a result, such theories would reintroduce the uncertainty of personal jurisdiction
law into the child custody domain, after the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and Congress attempted to eradicate it through the promulgation of the
UCCJA and the enactment of the PKPA. The minimum-contacts analysis, fo-
cusing as it does on the contacts of the absent parent with the forum state,
could preclude the state with the most substantial contact with the child from
entertaining a custody action. Thus, the application of a minimum-contacts the-
ory in the child custody context would severely undercut the effectiveness of the
UCCJA and the PKPA.17 2
B. A Revised Understanding of Jurisdiction to Determine Child Custody
The constitutional underpinnings of state court jurisdiction are, of course,
found in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 17 3 Although the
Supreme Court at one time suggested that state sovereignty, as well as an indi-
vidual's due process rights, were separate values protected through the personal
170. Id. at 410-13.
171. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
172. One commentator, however, has defended the application of a minimum-contacts standard to child cus-
tody litigation, asserting that such a requirement would protect the rights of the opposing parent and would not
compromise the interests of the child. See Sherman, Child Custody Jurisdiction and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act-A Due Process Dilemma?. 17 TULSA L.J. 713, 727 (1982).
173. The Supreme Court first articulated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction was a function of the
due process clause in Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). Although the Court has abandoned much of
Pennoyer's construct in later cases, the fundamental linking of state court jurisdiction with due process has re-
mained. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The Court's reliance on the
due process clause to protect state sovereignty has provoked much scholarly criticism. See. e.g., Redish. Due
Process. Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981); Whit-
ten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction" A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of
the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Pt. 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735 (1981). For a recent
defense of Justice Field's reliance on the fourteenth amendment as a bold federalization of individual rights, see
Kogan, infra note 210. at 331-44.
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jurisdiction doctrine,17 4 the Court more recently has made clear that personal
jurisdiction is an individual liberty interest, capable of waiver. 78
Nevertheless, territoriality is still undeniably an element of the jurisdic-
tional analysis. The minimum contacts doctrine, independent of fairness or rea-
sonableness concerns,171 ensures that the necessary territorial affiliation exists
between the defendant and the forum state for the assertion of in personam
jurisdiction.'" Other geographic connections, however, have supported other
kinds of judicial power. The presence of a trust corpus, for example, has been
held to justify the exercise of judicial power to foreclose an absent beneficiary's
opportunity to challenge the trustee's management of a trust.1 8 The domicile of
one spouse has been held to justify the exercise of power to dissolve the mar-
riage relation of the other (absent) spouse.'7 9 Thus, territorial jurisdiction varies
in its form, and the form determines the nature of constitutionally required ter-
ritorial connections. To recognize that the child custody court's assertion of
power affects the rights of the absent contestant does not lead ineluctably to the
conclusion that the personal jurisdiction/minimum contacts construct must
apply.
Justice Scalia's suggestion in Burnham v. Superior Court that judicial
competence to determine child custody requires the assertion of personal juris-
diction over the absent parent may heighten interest in the problem addressed
in this Article. Ironically, while the Burnham dicta revives the problem posed
by May v. Anderson, the themes in the various Burnham opinions may provide
a way out of the dilemma. In somewhat tautological reasoning, Scalia's plural-
ity opinion held that due process rights were to be defined by reference to the
rights protected by tradition. Justice Scalia wrote: "The short of the matter is
that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process be-
cause it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the
due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "180
174. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-93 (1980) (concept of minimum con-
tacts protects defendant against burden of inconvenient forum and also ensures "that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system").
175. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10
(1982), the Court explained that although personal jurisdiction doctrine operates to restrict state power, it "must
be seen as ultimately a function or the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause." This
revised explanation of the constitutional values at stake was reaffirmed in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzcwicz, 471
U.S. 462. 472 n.13 (1985).
176. See. e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108, 113 (1987) (discussing mini-
mum contacts doctrine separately from the reasonableness factors).
177. See generally Brilmayer. How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77; Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction.
65 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987).
178. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
179. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLtCT OF
LAWS § 71 (1971).
180. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 1205, 2115 (1990).
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. In contrast to the Court's approach in Shaffer v. Heitner,'8 ' World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'8 ' Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court,18 3 and other modern personal-jurisdiction cases, 84 Scalia's plurality re-
fused to engage in an independent inquiry into the fairness of the procedure
under challenge. Instead, Scalia reasoned that "its validation is its pedigree, as
the phrase 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' makes
clear.' 81 5 Responding to the argument that the Court should determine whether
the doctrine of transient jurisdiction remains justified, Justice Scalia explained:
Where. . .a jurisdictional principle is both firmly approved by tradition and still
favored, it is impossible to imagine what standard we could appeal to for the judgment
that it is "no longer justified. . . ." [A] doctrine of personal jurisdiction that dates
back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed
unquestionably meets [the standard of traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice].188
Thus, under the logic of the Scalia plurality, a traditional basis for estab-
lishing territorial jurisdiction, if still widely accepted, should survive a due pro-
cess challenge without an independent inquiry into the fairness of the proce-
dure. This reliance on "tradition-plus-modern-acceptance," plainly troublesome
in other contexts, 1 87 may make sense in the judicial jurisdiction domain. In Pen-
noyer v. Neff, Justice Field announced for the first time that proceedings to
enforce a judgment against a party over whom a court has no jurisdiction "do
not constitute due process of law."' 88 He explained that the terms "due process
of law," while hard to define in many contexts, are relatively simple to define as
applied to judicial proceedings. He wrote, "[t]hey then mean a course of legal
proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established
in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private
rights." 18 9 In light of Field's original reliance on "established rules and princi-
ples" in defining due process for purposes of judicial jurisdiction, Scalia's simi-
lar posture in 1990 seems defensible as a way of approaching jurisdictional
practices.
On the other hand, Scalia's refusal to consider independently the fairness
or reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction based on physical presence
181. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
182. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
183. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
184. See. e.g.. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985): Keeton v. Hustler Magazine. 465 U.S.
770 (1984).
185. Burnhan. 110 S. Ct. at 2116.
186. Id. at 2116-17.
187. The Court previously has relied on tradition to define the scope of fundamental rights protected by
substantive due process. See Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Michael H. v. Gerald D.. 491 U.S. 110
(1989). This inflexibility has triggered impassioned criticism both on and off the bench. See. e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick. 478 U.S. at 199-203 (Blackmun. J., dissenting); Michael H. v. Gerald D.. 491 U.S. at 136-57 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)- Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection. 54 U. Ciii. L. REv. 648.
649 (1987); Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn front Modern Physics. 103
HARV. L. Rhv. I, 15 n.60 (1989).
188. Pcnnoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
189. Id. For a discussion of the historical validity of Justice Field's view of the fourteenth amendment, see
authorities cited supra note 173.
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does conflict with the jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court since In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington.190 In International Shoe itself the Court
established a baseline of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice"' 91 against which to measure assertions of state court jurisdiction. That
standard has evolved into a flexible inquiry into the reasonableness of particular
jurisdictional practices, an inquiry not foreclosed by the practice's historical
pedigree. Indeed, the Court on occasion has invalidated as fundamentally unfair
certain assertions of judicial power based on procedures that were historically
accepted. The rejection of Delaware's quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v.
Heitner'9' is the salient example. Thus, it seems that Scalia's approach appro-
priately takes into account the jurisdictional doctrine's history and contempo-
rary acceptance, but inappropriately excludes any consideration of fairness.
Other justices in Burnham v. Superior Court focused on the question of
fairness in upholding the constitutionality of jurisdiction based on in-state ser-
vice. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor,
wrote that "all rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contempo-
rary notions of due process."''1 3 The "contemporary notions of due process" to
which Brennan referred apparently include the factors the Court has identified
in recent cases as defining the reasonableness of a particular exercise of jurisdic-
tion.8 4 The factors encompass the burden on the defendant, the forum's interest
in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining effective relief,
the interests of the interstate system in the most efficient resolution of contro-
versies, and the shared interest of several states in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social policies.' 95
The constitutionality of the exercise of territorial jurisdiction, then, should
be analyzed with reference both to the historical and contemporary acceptance
of a particular jurisdictional practice, and to the independent fairness or reason-
ableness of the practice. Both sorts of analysis, when applied to the child cus-
tody context, support the view that territorial jurisdiction exists in a state in
which the child resides or is present. In enacting the UCCJA, state legislatures
have required more connection than the constitutional minimum for policy rea-
sons-to ensure that an interested forum with access to the relevant evidence
hears the case. In enacting the PKPA, Congress approved of the UCCJA's ba-
sic formulation.
One can apply the logic of the Scalia plurality in Burnham to the child
custody context in a straightforward manner. If state courts in the United
States traditionally asserted the power to determine child custody on the basis
of either the child's connection with the state or the absent parent's connection
to the state, then the continuation of that practice today should not be vulnera-
ble under the due process clause. As noted in Part I, the early common law
190. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
191. Id. at 316.
192. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
193. Burnham. I30 S. Ct. at 2120.
194. Id. at 2122 n.7.
195. See. e.g.. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewic, 471 U.S. 462. 476-77 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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regarding a court's competence to determine child custody jurisdiction focused
on the child's connection with the forum state. That connection was, tradition-
ally, the child's domicile. 196 The notion of exclusive jurisdiction in the state of
domicile gradually gave way to an expanded jurisdictional view in the twentieth
century that included the child's domicile or residence, the child's presence, or
the existence of "personal jurisdiction" over both parents, as a sufficient basis
for custody jurisdiction. 9 7
The expanded common-law theories of jurisdiction were parsed and delim-
ited in our current statutory approaches. Although the UCCJA and the PKPA
abandoned the technical concept of domicile as a basis of jurisdiction, and also
narrowed the significance of the child's presence, the jurisdictional standards of
the two statutes remained focused on the child's connection to the forum state
through the concepts of "home state" and "significant connection" jurisdiction.
Except in cases of emergency or residual jurisdiction, the UCCJA and the
PKPA operate to place custody jurisdiction in the states with substantial inter-
est in the child's welfare.
The evolution of child custody jurisdiction reveals that the generally ac-
cepted theories of judicial competence, from nineteenth-century common law
through contemporary statutory guidelines, have generally focused on the con-
tact of the child with the forum state, and not on the ties of the defendant with
the state.198 With occasional aberrations, courts assumed that judicial power
existed to determine custody once the requisite connection between the child
and the forum state was established. Only when that connection was absent did
the courts articulate a need for personal jurisdiction over the defending
parent.1 99
Under Scalia's theory in Burnham of "tradition-plus-modern-acceptance,"
the child-centered jurisdictional standard, supported in history and in contem-
porary law, provides a constitutional basis for asserting power over the absent
parent. Thus, I would posit that "territorial" jurisdiction is constitutionally re-
quired in the child custody context, because the child custody court must neces-
sarily assert power over the person of the absent parent. Territorial jurisdiction
for custody purposes, however, is not the equivalent of personal jurisdiction for
purposes of asserting a monetary claim. Based on historical practice and current
law, a child-centered standard for asserting territorial jurisdiction in the custody
context (child's established home, child's significant connection, child's pres-
ence) is consistent with the due process clause. Stated conversely, no strong
tradition in the common law requires personal jurisdiction over the absent par-
ent before a court can determine child custody.
May v. Anderson can be read as requiring an assertion of power by the
state through formal legislative processes. In other words, in order for a state to
exercise territorial jurisdiction in the child custody context, it must have a long-
196. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
197. See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763. 776-79, 197 P.2d 739, 748-50 (1948); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
198. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
199. See authorities cited supra notes 52-54.
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
arm statute that enables its courts to bind the absent parent to a decree. Signifi-
cantly, the UCCJA not only guarantees the procedural due process rights of
notice and opportunity to be heard but also addresses extraterritorial notice.
Section 5 of the Act expressly requires notice to persons outside the forum state
and prescribes the acceptable methods of notice and proof of service.200 That
explicit authorization could serve the function of a long-arm statute for pur-
poses of binding the absent contestant. 201
An assessment of fairness concerns, the second dimension of the constitu-
tional equation, reveals that the current statutory approach to defining custody
jurisdiction clearly serves the interests of the plaintiff, the forum state, and the
interstate system. As explained in Part I, the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws attempted to achieve a jurisdictional structure that would enable the state
most familiar with the child and her family to determine her custody. Congress,
in turn, endorsed the basic philosophy of the Commissioners. In utilizing "home
state" and "significant connection" jurisdiction, the Commissioners and Con-
gress drafted definitions that would ensure the availability of evidence relevant
to the child's welfare. Concomitantly, the Commissioners assumed that the state
where such evidence is available would have, by virtue of its close connection
with the child, an interest in adjudicating the child's custody and thereby pro-
tecting her welfare. The adoption of the UCCJA in every state and Congress'
enactment of the PKPA show that the "interstate system" favors the basic ju-
risdictional formulation of the UCCJA and the PKPA.
The burden on the defendant remains an important factor in the Supreme
Court's current doctrines of territorial jurisdiction. If, for example, a child and
one parent establish a home in State X, a state that the other parent has never
entered, is it "fair" for State X to determine the child's custody? In such a
scenario, the absent parent, lacking all contact with the forum, might claim that
his or her rights under the due process clause would be violated by the exercise
of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the tripolar nature of the custody dispute distin-
guishes it from the ordinary bipolar lawsuit, and the burdens on the defendant
should not be allowed to eclipse the contacts of the child in assessing the fair-
ness of jurisdiction.20' Because the child's interest depends so heavily on the
availability of a forum with access to relevant evidence, and because both cus-
tody contestants share an interest in the effective resolution of the matter, the
mere lack of contacts by the absent parent with the forum state seems out-
weighed by other concerns.
200. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURis. ACT § 5, 9 U.L.A. 212-13 (1988).
201. Understandably, some state court cases have concluded that the UCCJA, as presently cast, does not
authorize the assertion or personal jurisdiction and therefore does not support the assertion of judicial power to
bind an absent parent. See Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984) (neither UCCJA nor PKPA authorizes
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents). That conclusion derives from the Commissioners' position
on the irrelevance or personal jurisdiction in the child custody context. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying
text. Moreover, Professor Bodenheimer explained that the Commissioners decided against the inclusion of a long-
arm statute because of their doubts that any such statute could "stretch ... far enough." Bodenheimer, supra
note 141, at 1232-33.
202. Professor Bodenheimer made a similar argument based on the "tripartite" nature of custody disputes in
support of her theory that a custody decree is an adjudication of status. Bodenheimer & Neely-Kvarme, supra
note 16. at 233.
[Vol. 52:369
CHILD CUSTODY
Moreover, even Justice Brennan in Burnham v. Superior Court argued that
historical practice and contemporary acceptance are relevant to the fairness in-
quiry. In Burnham, he reasoned that "the fact that American courts have an-
nounced the rule for perhaps a century . . . provides a defendant voluntarily
present in a particular State today 'clear notice that [he] is subject to suit' in
the forum. ' 20 3 Similarly, the long-standing approach to child custody jurisdic-
tion in this country focused first on domicile, and later on domicile or presence.
The current statutory approaches to custody jurisdiction utilize a variation of
the common law by adopting the concepts of home-state and significant-connec-
tion jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the child-centered measure of custody jurisdic-
tion is consistent with the early approaches and should place parents or other
custody contestants on notice that the state where the child resides or has signif-
icant contact is empowered to determine custody.
This revised understanding of the child custody/personal jurisdiction di-
lemma avoids the problems created by other approaches. Under the analysis
presented here, the modern statutory formulations of child custody jurisdiction
continue a tradition of jurisdiction based on child-centered contacts. Such for-
mulations should survive constitutional challenge, both because of their histori-
cal pedigree and contemporary acceptance, and because of their consistency
with the fairness concerns that are central to due process.
The theory I am advancing contemplates that the territorial jurisdiction
asserted under the UCCJA would be a kind of "specific jurisdiction. '20 4 The
state court power that arises under the UCCJA, based on child-centered con-
tacts, is power specific to the custody of the child. Territorial jurisdiction for
other purposes, such as the imposition of child support or alimony obligations,
has traditionally required a different, defendant-centered justification. 05 On the
other hand, if an absent parent is otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction in
the "general jurisdiction" sense, then that basis of jurisdiction ought to suffice
for the custody determination as well.206 For instance, if both parents consent to
the jurisdiction of a particular state, that state should be deemed empowered to
determine child custody, even in the absence of the specified showings under
Section 3 of the UCCJA.207 It would seem that the UCCJA's policies of final-
203. Burnhan, 110 S. Ct. at 2124. Justice Scalia criticized Brennan's approach as "just tradition masquer-
ading as 'fairness.'" Id. at 2114.
204. The contrasting terms of "specific jurisdiction" and "general jurisdiction" were developed 35 years ago
to help courts more lucidly grapple with jurisdictional problems, see A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN. THE LAW
O- MULTISTATE PROBLEsts 653-54 (1965), but the terminology was not adopted by the United States Supreme
Court until relatively recent times. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall. 466 U.S. 408, 414
nn.8-9 (1984). See generally Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988).
205. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
206. Although most state courts appear to view the UCCJA's prescribed bases of jurisdiction as exclusive,
see. e.g.. Loper v. Superior Court, 126 Ariz. 14, 612 P.2d 65 (1980), at least one state seems to accept "status"
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction as alternative bases. See Creavin v. Moloney, 773 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1989).
207. The cases that endorse a subject matter jurisdictional characterization of child custody power have
rejected consent as an adequate jurisdictional basis, e.g., Mace v. Mace, 215 Neb. 640, 341 N.W.2d 307 (1983).
and Professor Bodenheimer took a similar position. See Bodenheimer, supra note 141 at 1228. Professor Ratner
has cogently argued that consent ought to be an alternative basis of power under the UCCJA. See Ratner, supra
note 8. at 406-10.
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ity, interstate cooperation, and advancement of the best interests of children are
all served by an acceptance of consensual jurisdiction based on the voluntary
participation of both parents. Similarly, no harm to the policies of the PKPA
would occur if the Act were amended to require interstate recognition of de-
crees rendered after voluntary participation by both contestants.
The characterization of the jurisdictional standards under the UCCJA as
"territorial" rather than "subject matter" would serve another purpose. The ju-
risdictional requirements, if not raised at the first opportunity by the opposing
custody claimant, ought to be deemed waived. The nonwaivability of challenges
to subject-matter jurisdiction has led courts to entertain belated objections to
the competence of the child custody court. 208 Once a court has received evi-
dence and made a custody determination after participation by both parents, a
procedural rule that allows a disgruntled litigant to challenge the court's compe-
tence after the fact makes little sense. Such an approach, which invites the
waste of judicial resources and tactical maneuvering in general, 09 is particu-
larly troublesome in the child custody context. The rule of nonwaivability of
jurisdictional objections leads to the very duplicative litigation that the UCCJA
and PKPA were designed to prevent. A characterization of the jurisdictional
standards under the UCCJA and the PKPA as elements of territorial jurisdic-
tion would signal to the courts and to litigants that such jurisdictional objections
must be raised at the outset.
III. CONCLUSION
Courts ought to recognize that power over the absent parent is a necessary
element of judicial competence in child custody litigation. Judges should aban-
don the unfortunate habit of characterizing their competence in child custody
cases as "subject-matter jurisdiction" and of declaring that personal jurisdiction
is not required. Such formalism leads to unanalytic opinions and, frequently, to
undesirable results.
The Burnham v. Superior Court case raises anew, albeit through Justice
Scalia's misunderstanding of the jurisdictional issues before the Court, the
problem of the due process rights of absent parents in child custody disputes.
The Burnham case suggests that May v. Anderson's dated perception of judicial
authority in child custody cases still informs the thinking of at least some of the
justices. I disagree with that thinking, to the extent it would require that an
absent parent be subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum state before a
court could constitutionally determine the custody of that parent's child. I have
argued here that although judicial power over the absent parent is a constitu-
tional necessity, such power, more aptly termed "territorial jurisdiction," can
arise from child-centered contacts with the forum. Themes running through the
Burnham opinions point a way to accommodate the constitutional interests at
stake without undermining the advances of the UCCJA and the PKPA.
208. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
209. See Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judg-
ment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491 (1967).
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Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, reasoned that traditional approaches
to personal jurisdiction, if they are reflected in widely accepted modern practice,
provide all the process that is due under the fourteenth amendment. In the child
custody context, courts have traditionally exercised authority over the custody
contestants on the basis of the child's connection to the forum. That child-cen-
tered approach to judicial competence is continued today in the carefully drawn
rules of the UCCJA and the PKPA. The nonresident parent is on notice that
the state where the child resides or has significant contact may assert power to
determine the child's custody. Such power, or territorial jurisdiction, binds the
absent parent within the forum state and, under the PKPA, outside the state.210
While the theory advanced in this Article validates the basic approach of
the UCCJA and the PKPA, it does invite changes in the jurisdictional thinking
of many courts. In particular, the theory urged here would accept consent, as
well as other bases of "general personal jurisdiction,' 21  as an alternative basis
of jurisdiction in custody disputes. Moreover, the theory would preclude belated
challenges to the territorial jurisdiction of the custody court.
Jurisdictional uncertainty, and the litigation it produces, waste time and
resources for all participants in the judicial system. In the child custody context,
jurisdictional ambiguity leads as well to conflicting custody determinations and
instability in the personal lives of the litigants and children. In that area, per-
haps more than in others, our judicial system owes to the participants a frame-
work of clear jurisdictional lines and predictable outcomes.211
210. The recognition in constitutional theory of the relevance of a national consensus on child custody juris-
diction may comport with the "neo-federalist" view of personal jurisdiction. See Kogan. A Neo-Federalist Tale of
Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S CAL L. REv. 257 (1990) (arguing that changes in personal jurisdiction doctrine from
before Pennoyer through International Shoe reflect changes in our constitutional identity as a federal nation).
211. Justice Scalia apparently would hold that service of process on a defendant in the forum state is suffi-
cient to support judicial power to determine the custody of the defendant's children. See Burnham. 110 S. Ct. at
2109. If such a case were to arise in a forum that had virtually no connection to the child or the contestants, one
would hope that a court uould favorably receive a forum non conveniens motion.
212. I have made this point in another context. See Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and
Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity. 36 UCLA L. REV. 1051 (1989).
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